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From Peasants to  
Farmers: Peasant 
Differentiation, Labor 
Regimes, and Land-Rights 
Institutions in China’s 
Agrarian Transition
Q. Forrest Zhang1 and John A. Donaldson1
Abstract
The development of factor markets has opened Chinese agriculture for the penetration 
of capitalism. This new round of rural transformation—China’s agrarian transition—
raises the agrarian question in the Chinese context. This study investigates how 
capitalist forms and relations of production transform agricultural production and the 
peasantry class in rural China. The authors identify six forms of nonpeasant agricultural 
production, compare the labor regimes and direct producers’ socioeconomic statuses 
across these forms, and evaluate the role of China’s land-rights institution in shaping 
these forms. The empirical investigation presents three main findings: (1) Peasant 
differentiation: capitalist forms of agricultural production differentiate peasants into 
a variety of new class positions. (2) Market-based stratification: producers in capitalist 
agriculture are primarily stratified by their positions in labor and land markets; their 
socioeconomic statuses are linked with their varying degrees of proletarianization. 
(3) Institutional mediation: rural China’s dual-track land system plays a crucial role in 
shaping the diverse and unique forms of capitalist production.
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Old Wu spent most of his adulthood eking out a meager living as a peasant in one of 
China’s poorest areas—Zhaotong Prefecture in the southwestern province of Yunnan. 
Like most rural producers living under China’s Household Responsibility System 
(HRS), Old Wu and his family were allocated use rights over a tiny plot of collectively 
owned farmland in his native village. Too many people farming too little land under 
harsh natural conditions had trapped his family in a life of poverty and what has been 
described as “agricultural involution”—increasing intensity of labor use merely to 
maintain an unstable subsistence.1 Like many other rural residents, he chose migration 
to search for a better life. Unlike most other migrants in China who shift from coun-
tryside to city, however, Old Wu, wife and five children in tow, migrated to another 
rural area—Donglin Village in An’ning County, near the provincial capital city of 
Kunming. There, he was employed as a farm worker by an urban entrepreneur who 
used his connections with the village authority to rent undeveloped village land long-
term. On this land, the entrepreneur established a commercial orchard and rural recre-
ation area, where Old Wu works with other hired hands to tend the five hundred mu of 
fruit trees,2 pick the fruit, and receive guests seeking to get away from the stresses of 
the city. The Wus, living in employer-provided housing, receive far more in wages 
than they could have hoped to obtain from subsistence farming. At the same time, 
however, old Wu now answers to a tongue-in-cheek self-described landlord, a class 
that is reemerging in some numbers after a hiatus that began soon after 1949.
Despite the apparent continuity between his life as a peasant in Zhaotong and as a 
farm worker in An’ning, Old Wu has more than just shifted geographically. He and his 
family have migrated away from the traditional household-based subsistence farming, 
which has dominated rural China for millennia, to a capitalist form of production in 
which Old Wu sells labor to the owner of substantial land rights and capital. The Wus 
have joined the newest revolution in rural China: the penetration of capitalism into 
agriculture and the transformation of the peasantry.
In the Reform era (1978 onward), China’s rural society has experienced rapid 
changes sparked by rural industrialization and rural-to-urban migration. Changes in 
the rural social structure followed at the heels of these economic changes—most nota-
bly, rising disparities among rural residents and the growing ranks of both rural entre-
preneurs and rural nonfarm workers. However, these rapid changes notwithstanding, 
agriculture itself in rural China has remained largely unchanged since the implementa-
tion of the HRS in the early 1980s. Among rural China’s agricultural producers, the 
traditional household-based subsistence farming persisted as the dominant form.
During the past few years, however, new developments in rural China have opened 
agriculture to the penetration of capitalist relations of production. With that, the age-
old agrarian question reemerges in a new Chinese context and presents itself at the 
forefront of studies of rural China. Numerous questions emerge. How does the pene-
tration of capitalism into agriculture transform agricultural production and rural social 
structure in China? How does shifting from traditional household-based farming to 
capitalist forms of agricultural production affect rural producers socioeconomically? 
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How do social institutions in rural China mediate the confrontation between capitalism 
and agriculture to create unique outcomes?
In this article, we address these questions by examining new forms of production, 
class relations, and labor regimes that have emerged in rural China’s agrarian transi-
tion. More specifically, we investigate (1) how the spread of capitalist relations of 
production transforms farming households in rural China from subsistence peasants 
into new social classes, (2) how the social power and economic benefits of agricultural 
producers in different forms of capitalist production are linked with their varying 
degrees of proletarianization, and (3) how rural China’s dual-track land system medi-
ates the interaction between capital and labor and creates diverse and unique labor 
regimes in China’s agrarian capitalism.
In the following, we first try to provide a rigorous conceptualization of the “peas-
antry” as a social class in the Chinese context. We then discuss the persistence of Chinese 
peasantry throughout previous episodes of rural social changes and compare how this 
new round of social change—which we summarize as China’s transition to agrarian 
capitalism—will affect the peasantry differently. Our empirical findings of various 
forms of capitalist production and social relations in these forms are presented next. 
We then summarize the empirical evidence to address the three research questions 
outlined above and conclude with a discussion on the implications of this study for 
future research.
The Chinese Peasantry: From  
Resilience to Dissolution
Peasants and the Peasant Form of Production
The term peasant is a politically charged and often contested or misused term, as 
shown in the “peasant essentialism” debate, as well as in the Chinese context.3 The 
great historical and spatial variability in the social existence of noncapitalist agricul-
tural producers has given rise to competing conceptualizations of the characteristics 
that constitute peasantness.4 In this study, we adopt Friedmann’s approach and define 
peasants as those agricultural producers who, first, use family labor—and thus the 
household as the unit of production—to produce mainly for subsistence and, second, 
depend on noncommoditized relations for the household’s reproduction. Friedmann 
proposes using “forms of production” as the central concept in analyzing agrarian 
social relations and defines forms of production through a double specification of the 
unit of production and its social formation.5 Social formation here refers to the context 
for reproduction of units of production. In this way, peasant production, as a form of 
production, is then distinguished from other forms (such as simple commodity produc-
tion and capitalist production) by the combination of two characteristics: the use of 
households as units of production and the noncommoditized reproduction of the house-
holds. This latter, according to Friedmann, means that “access to land, labour, credit, 
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and product markets is mediated through direct, non-monetary ties to other house-
holds or other classes, and . . . these ties are reproduced through institutionally stable 
reproductive mechanisms.”6
To be sure, this definition of peasants excludes other characteristics often associ-
ated with peasantness, such as subjugation to more powerful outside interests and 
embeddedness in the traditional rural community.7 However, it achieves both parsi-
mony and conceptual consistency through the two common denominators of peasant-
ries: household production and noncommoditized reproduction.8 This definition is 
also particularly suited to investigating the agrarian question—how penetration of 
capitalism transforms agricultural production—because it specifically draws the dis-
tinction between peasant production under noncapitalist economies and forms of pro-
duction under capitalist economies.
Based on this two-pronged conceptualization of peasants, we can then deductively 
hypothesize the two directions taken by capitalist transformation of the peasant form 
of production. The first involves a shift to commoditized reproduction of the house-
holds. While rural households remain as units of production, the social context for 
their reproduction changes as they increasingly depend on commodity relations for 
such reproduction. This occurs when farming households are integrated into markets 
for exchanging land, credit, farm input, and products needed to secure their subsis-
tence and production. To use Friedmann’s term, this form of production, based on 
households as units of production but with commoditized reproduction of the house-
holds, constitutes simple commodity production; the simple commodity producers can 
be called farmers.9 Second, agricultural production can expand beyond the rural 
household as a unit of production, either by dissolving the household or by subsuming 
it under a larger organizational unit. This occurs when labor becomes commoditized. 
Family labor is replaced with wage labor, sold, individually or collectively, by produc-
ers and bought by capital owners, who reorganize it into production. Friedmann labels 
this form capitalist production and its producers farm workers.10
The hypothesis explored here is that once land, labor, and capital become commod-
itized, peasant production will change along these two dimensions. Our empirical 
investigation of this hypothesis will thus explore these two routes of de-peasantization 
resulting from penetration of capitalism into China’s agriculture and how they trans-
form peasant producers. In the next section, we briefly review the persistence of the 
peasant form of production in rural China in previous episodes of social changes, 
before describing recent developments in rural China that ushered in capitalist com-
modity relations and began the process of de-peasantization.
China’s Resilient Peasantry: De-Agrarianization  
without De-Peasantization
In contemporary sociology, much of the interest on the agrarian question centers on 
the persistence of family production in agriculture—put either as the “small farm prob-
lem” or “embarrassment of the peasantry”—in both advanced capitalist societies and 
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developing countries.11 In the Chinese context, however, different questions arise 
because the Chinese peasantry showed resilience against not only capitalism but also 
socialism. Prior to the Communist revolution and founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949, peasant production not only persisted but remained dominant in 
agriculture, and the question was more about the absence of capitalist development.12 
In the socialist period, China’s Communist leaders saw collectivized large-scale agri-
culture as a necessity for capital accumulation and rapid industrialization and perceived 
smallholding peasant production as fertile ground for spontaneous capitalism. Thus, 
the state attempted a wholesale elimination of the peasantry through collectivizing agri-
cultural production. Yet some argue that turbulent policy changes over the past sixty 
years of the People’s Republic have only resulted in an expanded peasantry.13
The short-lived land-reform policy of the early 1950s granted land rights to all 
peasants, solidifying smallholding peasant households as units of agricultural pro-
duction, while also subjecting them to the political domination and economic extrac-
tion of an increasingly powerful state.14 The subsequent collectivization campaign 
later that decade had the elimination of the smallholding peasant economy as a key 
policy goal and reversed the land-reform policy with regard to family-based land-
holding and production.15 Under collectivized socialist agriculture, collective bri-
gades and communes replaced rural households as units of production. However, the 
reproduction of these collective units of production was still not commoditized but, 
rather, was done through either self-provisioning or through “direct, non-monetary 
ties” to other units of production and state agencies.16 Despite the difference in unit 
of production, this form of noncommoditized collective production shares two key 
similarities with peasant production: the exclusion of commodity relations in social 
reproduction and the personal subjugation of direct producers to external actors—in 
this case, the socialist state. Thus, it is probably more accurate to call this form “social-
ist peasants” and see the result of collectivization not as elimination of the peasantry 
but, rather, its preservation—or, as some put it, the “re-feudalization of the Chinese 
peasantry.”17
The third shift, de-collectivization, implemented between 1978 and 1984, disman-
tled agricultural communes and allocated land-use rights—though not ownership—
directly to rural households. With the breakup of the communes, rural China again 
became a sea of smallholding producers. These moves reinstated family farms as the 
unit of production in Chinese agriculture, reinforcing the peasantry as a class.18 Rural 
China experienced rapid changes in this period, especially industrialization and mass 
migration, both of which transferred, on a large scale, rural labor to nonagricultural 
employment. However, much less was happening within agricultural production itself, 
beyond the gradual growth of markets for farm inputs and products. While some 
households hired workers on a small scale, the majority of the rural population that 
remained in agriculture continued in the traditional form of production, using house-
hold labor to till small, often discontinuous, plots of contracted household land to “pro-
duce mostly for their own consumption, direct or indirect.”19 Therefore, while in the third 
phase, China’s rural population has experienced rapid de-agrarianization (i.e., growth 
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of nonagricultural sectors), for the agricultural producers, the peasant form of produc-
tion still dominated, muting the de-peasantization process.20
If these three major policy changes could not shake the foundation of the Chinese 
peasantry, what forces could possibly create enduring structural changes among China’s 
agricultural producers? We hypothesized earlier that the spread of capitalist relations 
of production into agriculture, mainly through the expansion of labor and other factor 
markets in rural China, would push forward de-peasantization along two directions 
and differentiate the peasantry into simple commodity farmers and capitalist farm 
workers. But are the conditions present for the penetration of capitalism into agricul-
ture in China?
Agrarian Transition in China
Two recent developments lead us to argue that capitalism has started its penetration 
into Chinese agriculture and the fourth phase of rural transformation is under way—
which, in contrast to the three previous episodes of social change in rural China under 
the PRC, we call the “rise of agrarian capitalism.” First, the Chinese central state in 
recent years has been actively promoting the scaling-up of agricultural production 
through encouraging private, collective, and public companies to enter agriculture and 
organize agricultural production.21 Critics of de-collectivization have long lamented 
the loss of scale caused by dividing commune land to household production.22 Other 
East Asian governments such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to reduce loss of 
production caused by land reform, all resorted to some efforts to consolidate overly 
parcelized land resulting from their land-reform policies.23 The Chinese government 
has also tried to increase productivity of its agriculture through increased-scale pro-
duction. One often-adopted program is introducing industrial capital into agricultural 
production through many conduits including “dragon-head enterprises.”24 As these 
firms, regardless of their ownership type, are virtually all market-integrated firms, we 
expect their entrance into China’s agrarian economy—combined with central and 
local policies intended to promote scaled-up and modern agricultural production—to 
be a major impetus in introducing capitalist forms of production that organize produc-
tion beyond the household and the use of wage labor.
Second, the lack of market mobility allowing productive factors such as land to 
circulate and concentrate in a few hands had previously been a primary barrier to the 
development of capitalism in Chinese agriculture. However, the recent rapid develop-
ment in all factor markets has finally put that missing piece in place. Labor mobility, 
especially that of rural labor, is already remarkably high in China.25 Much of this labor 
mobility has been agriculture-to-nonagriculture labor flow. However, once more 
rewarding employment opportunities began to emerge within agriculture itself, rural-
to-rural migration of poor surplus agricultural labor increased. One study, for exam-
ple, concludes that, as early as 1995, some 12.9 million migrants traveled from one 
rural area to another, up from a modest 2 million in 1988.26
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Meanwhile, capital markets in rural China, for their part, remain underdeveloped. 
The state-run Rural Credit Cooperative system is in shambles and riddled with corrup-
tion, partly due to repeated unsuccessful administrative changes to the system, and tends 
to divert funds away from agricultural production in favor of enterprise development.27 
However, other conditions provide some remedy to the underdeveloped capital mar-
kets. First, the small scale of China’s peasant production—the departure point for 
producers’ spontaneous capitalism—means that even small amounts of capital, accumu-
lated from profits in agriculture, via migrant remittances, or through other income 
sources created by China’s reform policies, often suffices to allow initial steps toward 
more modern production. Second, new opportunities have emerged in rural China to 
secure underground financing through kinship networks and informal financial institu-
tions such as rotating credit associations.28 If such underground banking was able to 
help launch rural industrialization in coastal regions, it should be able to support the 
rise of agrarian capitalism as well. Finally, the state and various nongovernment orga-
nizations have also implemented a number of programs that focus on alleviating the 
lack of credit for peasants in rural China.
Finally, the immobility of land had previously been the greatest barrier to the rise 
of agrarian capitalism in rural China. Under rural China’s dual-track land system, 
farmland (and much of the country’s forest land and various types of unutilized or 
undeveloped land) is collectively owned by villages. Land-use rights are then con-
tracted to peasant households on a largely egalitarian basis as an entitlement.29 While 
village authorities reallocate land from time to time to adjust land distribution to 
demographic changes, each peasant household’s access to a piece of land is theoreti-
cally guaranteed as an entitlement based on its membership in the collective and, thus, 
becomes economically inalienable.30 But since the mid-1990s, land-rental markets 
have developed rapidly in many rural areas, allowing use rights of contracted collec-
tive land to circulate among rural households through market exchanges. While the 
buying and selling of rural land is still not permitted, these rental markets have allowed 
the scaling-up of agricultural production.31
Farmland has been the last frontier for the penetration of markets and commodity 
relations in agricultural production. Once this last piece falls into place, we have strong 
reason to expect that new actors will enter the agriculture sector and that new forms of 
production that transcend the boundary of family farms and rely on commodity rela-
tions for reproduction will emerge. Land-rental markets make it possible for some 
producers to part with their access to—or control over—means of production, partly 
or completely, while at the same time, other actors accumulate more land. Subsequently, 
newly semiproletarianized and proletarianized agricultural laborers can then sell their 
labor to owners of land rights and capital, transforming themselves from peasants to 
various new types of producers.
To date, little of the extensive research on rural China covering wide-ranging issues, 
including rural industrialization, rural governance, migration, productivity changes, 
and land disputes, has focused on the emerging transformation of the Chinese peasant 
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class. Many of the forms that are analyzed below have in fact been noticed in the lit-
erature. As early as 1985, a survey by Unger documented the emergence of entrepre-
neurial farming, while a number of Chinese and Western scholars, starting from the 
beginning of the present decade, have researched contract farming.32 In late 2009, one 
volume of World Development devoted to studying the agrifood industry’s impact on 
small farming dedicated no fewer than three articles to China. Oddly, one of these 
studies, while noticing numerous unanswered questions in the literature, concluded 
that the rapid changes in the agrifood industry in China brought no structural shift to 
China’s farmers.33 Despite these and other studies, the researchers also noted serious 
gaps in the literature. In particular, no research to date has focused systematically on 
the emergence of new forms of agricultural production by examining the recent changes 
in the power relationships between the farmer, agribusiness firm, and the state. The 
present article endeavors to remedy this neglect of the agrarian question by focusing 
on an important yet understudied process of social transformation in China’s rural 
society.
Identifying Pathways
This research on the confrontation between capitalism and agriculture in China, the 
multiple labor regimes it creates, and the changes it brings to the peasantry is primar-
ily based on fieldwork conducted during three trips in 2007 and 2009 in two Chinese 
provinces. Since patterns of agrarian capitalism in China likely vary by region, we 
visited one province each from China’s coastal (Shandong) and inland (Yunnan) 
provinces. We also incorporated insights from previous fieldwork in other provinces, 
as well as from secondary sources. For both provinces, we researched agricultural 
products that have expanded past household production, in terms of either increased 
labor or land. We selected a range of cases that allowed us to examine the role of dif-
ferent actors that have stimulated expanded production, including rural households, 
local entrepreneurs, domestic Chinese companies, multinational corporations, and the 
central and local governments. In Shandong, we studied the production of fruit, veg-
etables, and poultry. In Yunnan, we examined tea, coffee, wasabi, vegetables, fresh-cut 
flowers, fruit, and rubber. During our fieldwork, we interviewed government officials, 
farmers, entrepreneurs, managers, staff, and others involved in the growing, harvest-
ing, marketing, and processing of these crops. In addition, we visited fields and home-
steads in these areas to witness firsthand the processes that were occurring. In each of 
these areas, capitalist forms—and relations—of production have emerged, but in dif-
ferent ways and with varying effects on the social and political life of rural residents.
We classify the numerous examples of nonpeasant production of commercial crops 
into six distinct forms of production (with household-based subsistence farming as the 
reference category) based on the combination of units of production and social forma-
tion (see Table 1). As we move through this typology, the forms vary along two 
dimensions. First, in all but one (form 1), the control over—and use of—labor and 
land expands beyond the household in some way, through utilizing more land or labor 
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than that allocated or originally available to the household. Second, commodity rela-
tions enter into all forms of production, but vary in degree and scope. Especially with the 
commoditization of land and labor, social relationships between actors change. Various 
employment relationships are formed; distinct labor regimes emerge. Some rural resi-
dents gain control over more land and labor and improve their social power vis-à-vis 
the state or corporate capital, while others lose control, subjecting them to exploitation 
by other, often new, actors. Under these forms, the status of these direct producers shifts 
from “peasants” under household peasant production to “commercial farmers,” under 
simple commodity production, or “farm workers,” under capitalist production. Moreover, 
the economic benefits for these former peasants also change. Although their conditions 
usually improve compared to the original form, the benefits of de-peasantization actu-
ally decline as the degree of producers’ proletarianization increases.
This typology identifies multiple pathways through which agrarian capitalism is 
emerging in rural China and how the de-peasantization process is unfolding along 
each pathway. Placing these forms on a table does not imply a stage model. Instead, 
one does not necessarily lead to another. This diversity of forms results from various 
agents’ experiments with capitalist agriculture, adaptation to local conditions, and nego-
tiation with other actors; it is common to see multiple forms coexisting within the 
same locality and sometimes within the same company. We see evidences of pressure, 
primarily from certain kinds of agribusinesses seeking to acquire more control over 
land and reduce the social power of labor, to shift toward greater proletarianization of 
farm workers, just as the neo-Leninist position on agrarian transition would predict.34 
However, specific local conditions, as well as intrinsic characteristics of agricultural 
production, as we will show, pose obstacles to such efforts and sustain other forms of 
production.
These forms are types distilled from inductive empirical generalization. They are 
often only approximated in specific cases in reality; many hybrids could also exist. 
Furthermore, the purpose of this study is not to quantitatively document the percent-
age of each form in the agricultural population nationwide, a task that awaits more 
comprehensive data, but rather to conceptually identify emerging forms of nonpeasant 
production and paths of de-peasantization.
Point of Departure: Subsistence Peasant
The point of departure for all these pathways of agrarian capitalism is well docu-
mented: household-based, smallholding production, mainly for the direct or indirect 
consumption of the household itself. By classifying them as subsistence peasants, we 
do not imply that these households are totally insulated from commodity relations. As 
Friedmann points out, “The chief unifying and distinguishing characteristic of the peas-
antry is partial integration into markets” (emphasis added).35 In fact, subsistence 
peasants can—and in China, generally do—produce surplus crops for sale. But the 
penetration of commodity relations has not yet severed these households from local, 
communal, noncommoditized relations for their reproduction.
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Although Friedmann’s differentiation between subsistence peasants and simple com-
modity producers—on the basis of commoditization of reproduction—is conceptually 
sound, methodologically it lacks specificity. What exactly constitutes “commoditiza-
tion of reproduction,” especially in the Chinese context? What do farming households 
need to do to have “complete separation of the household from all ties except those of 
market” and shift out of peasantry? Friedmann puts more emphasis on the external 
contexts in which households operate, such as high mobility of land, labor, and credit. 
While external conditions like the presence of markets do shape internal characteris-
tics of households, some households can still choose not to integrate into markets.36
In our view, for the Chinese context at least, the change that actually severs a 
household from all nonmarket, communal ties for its reproduction—and shifts them 
from subsistence peasants to simple commodity producers—is specialized production 
for nonlocal markets. This means that households specialize in producing cash crops 
that have negligible local demand.37 Because they engage in specialized production, 
which they need to do to stay competitive on markets, they can no longer meet their 
subsistence needs through self-provisioning. Since they produce for nonlocal markets, 
they can no longer resort to local, reciprocal ties for the exchange of their products for 
means of subsistence. Thus, the shift from production mainly for self-consumption or 
local markets to specialized production for nonlocal markets leads to two other 
changes. First, the selling of these products, destined for distant markets, and the set-
ting of prices are consequently no longer influenced by local, particularistic relations 
but determined by abstract market forces unaffected by local social relations. Second, 
once these households are severed from local communal ties, but integrated into 
abstract, impersonal market relations, they enter into market competition with other 
specialized producers and become individualized enterprises, acquiring, in Weber’s 
words, “absolute economic individualism of the farmer, the quality of the farmer as a 
mere businessman.”38
As a result of these changes, when the simple commodity producers renew their 
means of production and subsistence, all of their interactions with other households 
and other classes are mediated by market relations and based on monetary terms. They 
become fully integrated into markets for the reproduction of the household. By com-
parison, subsistence peasant households produce either for self-consumption or for 
exchange on local markets, where their interactions with customers and the setting of 
prices are both embedded in the reciprocal, personalized relations of the local rural 
community. Their reproduction is either through self-provisioning or through local-
ized exchanges with at least some mediation by nonmarket relations.
Operating under these different contexts, subsistence peasants and simple com-
modity farmers also develop contrasting motivations and behaviors.39 Since their aim 
is subsistence rather than profit, peasants do not usually respond to changes in market 
prices by shifting to other products. When prices fall, increased self-exploitation, which 
results in deteriorating living conditions, is the typical response by subsistence peas-
ants. Without factor mobility of land and labor, peasant households also do not 
compete with each other as individual, rational enterprises. Instead, they are connected 
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through communal relations, such as reciprocal sharing of labor during busy seasons, 
which we frequently observed in the underdeveloped parts of China.
The particular form of peasant production in rural China resembles Friedmann’s 
“independent household production” in which the availability of and access to land 
allows households to resist commoditization and continue with subsistence produc-
tion.40 As noted earlier, rural China’s collective land ownership and HRS entitle peas-
ants to economically inalienable access to farmland. This means that even when they 
are less productive than other producers, as long as they do not have—or do not choose 
to pursue—alternative nonfarm employment opportunities, they cannot be forced out 
of subsistence farming by market competition. Thus, China’s land-rights institution 
and the land entitlement it provides represent what Friedmann calls “institutionally 
stable reproductive mechanisms” for subsistence peasants, providing them with a mod-
icum of social power.41
Distributing communal land among numerous households, however, also had its 
negative effects. First, scale of production was greatly reduced. In many parts of China, 
especially the more densely populated areas, each household’s contracted land barely 
sufficed to support the subsistence of the household.42 Second, rural households were 
turned into atomized individual actors, each too small, too poor, and too socially pow-
erless to integrate into markets for commercial crops. Without external help, they 
became risk-averse and adopted a survival-first strategy typical of smallholding sub-
sistence peasants.43 Together, these two forces prevented some peasants, especially 
those in more remote areas of China, from taking advantage of the new market forces 
released in rural China. Even though shifting to simple commodity production by 
growing high-value cash crops may be more profitable, for many of these smallhold-
ing peasants, shifting to crops destined for remote markets, which could only be 
accessed through external intermediaries, was too great a risk to their survival. Thus, 
despite many changes in rural China, this form of peasant production remains com-
mon throughout the country, especially outside wealthier coastal provinces.
Form 1: Commercial Farmer
The next type, commercial farmers, are producers in the simple commodity form of 
production—households that specialize in production for nonlocal markets and whose 
reproduction is all through commodity relations.44 Commercial farming had a long 
history in rural China, tracing back at least to the late imperial period. After its elimi-
nation during the collectivization period, this form reemerged just a few years after 
reform began, when marketization of agricultural products made it possible for com-
mercial households to sell their crops and buy grain on markets.45
As noted earlier, by shifting from subsistence farming to commercial farming, even 
though production is still organized within the household, the household itself is 
embedded into a wholly different context and, as a result, develops new motivational 
and behavioral characteristics. The aim of production shifts from subsistence to profit. 
Commercial farmers have, to some extent, shaken off traditional risk aversion. Since 
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they engage in competition with other producers, their survival as profit-seeking enter-
prises requires their adaptation to changes in relative prices and increases in productiv-
ity. Thus, their pursuit of higher productivity tends to raise the aggregate productivity 
of the agricultural sector.
Mr. Chen, a commercial farmer living in the rural areas of Simao Municipality 
(now renamed Pu’er Municipality), Yunnan Province, is a typical example. He and his 
family have shifted from growing corn on his farmland to exclusively growing coffee 
beans. This shift took several steps. At first, while Chen and his family tended the corn 
on their own plot, Chen himself worked in an ad hoc manner at Beigui, a local coffee-
producing town-and-village enterprise (TVE). There he earned essential cash to sup-
plement subsistence farming and also learned the skill of growing coffee. Soon afterward, 
just as Nestlé became active in the area as a buyer of coffee beans, Chen switched from 
working for Beigui to growing coffee beans on his family’s land. Soon the family, like 
most of its neighbors, switched completely out of growing corn and other grains to 
growing exclusively coffee beans on its twenty mu of land. Then, as now, the family 
sells exclusively to Nestlé, which has proven to be a dependable buyer, purchasing 
coffee beans at the international price (some computer-savvy farmers even check the 
international price on the Internet).46
By shifting from subsistence to commercial farming, the Chen family now depends 
entirely on markets for their reproduction. They sell their products at the international 
trading price to a multinational corporation, neither of which can be influenced by any 
local relations. Furthermore, the family’s reproduction depends on making a profit in 
its coffee production, which translates into maintaining a cost of production below the 
fluctuating and unpredictable international trading price. To do so, Chen invested the 
capital he accumulated in preliminary processing equipment to shell, clean, dry, and 
split (and otherwise add value to) coffee beans before delivery. The family also pur-
chased a truck, their second, which they use to deliver the beans to Nestlé’s buying 
station and transport grain, farm inputs, and other needs, which are all purchased on 
markets. While the fluctuation of coffee prices reportedly has hurt other coffee farm-
ers, partly because of his upgrading, Chen reports that it does not hurt him much and 
he makes at least some money each year—enough to buy on the open market all the 
means of subsistence. Chen’s coffee shrubs even survived the untimely frost in 1999, 
which devastated many local coffee farmers. Many commercial farmers responded to 
such changes by shifting out of the unprofitable coffee production and into the boom-
ing market of Pu’er tea (which subsequently faced a nationwide glut in supply and a 
steep drop in price). Chen’s family, however, chose to stay. Now cash from coffee 
sales allows the family to pay tuition and send their two children to a more prestigious 
boarding school in the municipal seat.
Few rural families, however, can shift from subsistence to commercial farming on 
their own. External conditions need to be present to connect producers and products to 
external markets. Thus, like the Chens, most subsistence peasants require some form of 
outside impetus to help them learn how to grow new economic crops and provide needed 
capital. More importantly, these farmers depend on others to provide two conditions: 
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the infrastructure for transporting the often-bulky products out to markets and market 
intermediaries that connect distant buyers to the producers. In some cases, when roads 
(even humble dirt roads) link local areas to marketing towns and beyond, middlemen 
can come in to purchase commercial crops, inducing households to shift production.
Oftentimes entrepreneurs and companies provide the needed access to skill, capital, 
and market. In Chen’s case for instance, first the Beigui Coffee Company, then Nestlé, 
acted as the outside stimulus that brought skill, cash, and, most importantly, the stable 
market that was required for the family’s shift into the exclusive commodity produc-
tion. According to a company representative, Nestlé purchases about one-third of Pu’er’s 
total output of coffee beans, directly from producers like Chen. Nestlé also provides 
free training to farmers who request it, through both training farmers directly and 
through training local technicians, with the provision that they subsequently train oth-
ers in coffee production.
Despite the importance of private enterprises, local governments often play the 
crucial role in providing the infrastructure and market connection and, thus, shape the 
growth of commercial farming in an area. This can be seen vividly in many places in 
rural China. Shouguang County in Shandong Province, for example, has become the 
largest vegetable production base and vegetable trading center in the country, thanks 
largely to efforts by local governments. Hundreds of trading companies are now based 
in Shouguang; hundreds of long-haul trucks depart daily to ship vegetables to every 
corner of the country. Similarly, in Yunnan Province’s Chenggong County, the local 
government established the largest flower trading and auction market in Asia, which 
brings in numerous trading firms to buy fresh-cut flowers from local commercial 
farmers. The government also set up a “green passage,” creating designated express 
lanes on local roads to facilitate the speedy transport of flowers to the international 
airport in the provincial capital. In cases like these, once governments provide the 
external conditions, local agriculture usually experiences a wholesale transformation 
from peasant production to commercial farming and other forms. As a result, develop-
ment of commercial farming in rural China often shows a pattern of regional special-
ization and concentration. The locus of competition shifts from among household 
producers, on the basis of household characteristics, to among producing regions, on 
the basis of conditions external to households.
Form 2: Entrepreneurial Farmer
When utilized labor and land expands outside household endowments, agriculture 
producers become entrepreneurial farmers. For this to happen, markets for labor and 
land must develop and commodity relations further penetrate into the renewal of land 
and labor. With the hiring of nonfamily wage labor, the unit of production transcends 
the household boundary and increases in scale. Economic, often exploitative, labor 
relations replace familial, patriarchal relations in organizing labor power in production. 
The entrepreneurial farmer departs from subsistence peasant in two ways: transcending 
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the household as the unit of production and integrating commodity relations into all 
areas of reproduction—including labor and land. Thus, entrepreneurial farming con-
stitutes a capitalist form of production.
For decades, Mr. Hong and his family toiled the ground of Dounan Village, an area 
of Yunnan Province known for its quality, fresh vegetables. In recent years, Dounan 
has begun producing vegetables in sufficiently large scale—much of it by commercial 
farmers—to market to urban areas, bringing newfound prosperity to the area. Hong 
first gained experience producing vegetables on his family’s allocated plot and on his 
neighbors’ plots, where he worked as a temporary hired hand. Soon, he attained suf-
ficient skill and capital to allow the family to increase the scale of production and 
upgrade to more skill-intensive and valuable varieties of vegetables, such as Italian 
lettuce. The Hong family began renting land from other households, renting at their 
peak between ten and twenty mu of land closer to Kunming, the provincial capital city. 
The increased scale of production also compelled the family to hire from the local 
labor market informal, temporary workers year-round, primarily migrants from poor, 
remote areas of Yunnan Province. The employment relationship is entirely casual and 
based on spot transactions, with no contracts, benefits, or protection. Wages are paid 
in cash after the work is done. The entrepreneurial farmer and the hired farmhands, 
nevertheless, do develop stable, long-term relationships. Mr. Hong has a group of his 
regular hires, who have already learned required skills. He sells his produce to whole-
salers, who in turn sell to outside, urban markets. This type of production has helped 
his household (and others like his) attain an annual income exceeding RMB 100,000 
(approximately US$14,600).47
The temporary farmhands ready for hire in local labor markets are immigrants 
from poor regions both within and outside Yunnan. After obtaining the required 
residence permits, they typically bring their entire families; rent older housing 
within the village; and send their children to local schools, paying the same tuition 
as local students. For many of them, aside from the short-term gain of labor wages, 
there is also a potential long-term gain: learning the skills of growing and selling 
vegetables commercially, which can allow them to become commercial or even 
entrepreneurial farmers on their own. For instance, many farmers in surrounding 
areas were willing to rent out their land to Dounan farmers, like Mr. Hong, and 
stayed on to work as laborers on their own land. When the five-year rental contract 
expired, these previously hired hands took back their land and started to farm veg-
etables on their own, although these tended to be less expensive types of vegeta-
bles, such as cabbage.
As the owner of the means and skills of production and with the means to hire out-
side labor, entrepreneurial farmers like Mr. Hong benefit from expanded production 
and market participation and, more importantly, extract surplus from hired laborers. 
They become the dominant actors in this capitalistic employment relationship to such 
an extent that entrepreneurial farmers, compared to producers in other forms in this 
typology, are positioned at the height of social power and economic benefit.
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Form 3: Contract Farmer
In the previous two forms of nonpeasant production, no corporate actors are involved. 
Even when labor is commoditized, the hiring of labor is done on an ad hoc basis 
without establishing long-term, formal employment relationships. Similarly, although 
production goes beyond the household, it is still not organized in a formal organiza-
tion structure. Aside from the capitalist production that spontaneously emerges with 
entrepreneurial farmers, another way to introduce capitalist production into agricul-
ture is through the entry of market-integrated, profit-seeking agribusiness into agricul-
tural production, a trend that the Chinese government has encouraged and supported 
in recent years.
As a number of scholars have shown, agriculture—as a land-based, seasonal, and 
natural process of production—poses special obstacles to capital.48 In some cases, 
capital is not able to industrially organize an agricultural production that is more pro-
ductive than small farmers. Capital often chooses to settle off-farm or near-farm on the 
agricultural commodity chain and specializes in producing farm inputs and processing 
farm outputs, while leaving the natural process of agricultural production—often the 
more risky part in the commodity chain—to small farmers. In other cases, capital man-
ages to industrialize agricultural production and obtain productivity superior to that of 
small farms. Then it often chooses to directly organize agricultural production to cap-
ture surplus generated in that process. Thus, the entry of capital into agriculture takes 
a variety of forms, ranging from contract farming to independent production. We wit-
ness the growth of a variety of these forms of capitalist agricultural production in China’s 
agrarian transition as well.
When agribusiness, for whatever reasons, is unable to industrially organize agricul-
tural production to outperform small farmers, it then has to procure agricultural prod-
ucts from small producers. When these small producers are independent commercial 
farmers, agribusinesses face the problem of fluctuating supply caused by producers’ 
shifting in and out of a commercial crop, sometimes dramatically, when prices for that 
crop change. One solution to that problem many companies have adopted is to have a 
production base that establishes formal contractual relationships with a large number 
of direct producers, usually in a contiguous area. In the Chinese context, this has been 
known as some variation of a “company + base + farmers” model.49 In this relation-
ship, the company typically provides farmers with raw materials, technology, training, 
service, and, in many cases, start-up capital. While the households retain control over 
their land and labor, they sign contracts, which generally lock them into a selling price, 
with a promise to sell their harvest to the company that established the base. We label 
this form the contract farmer.
One of the many examples that we encountered of this type of production was a 
Shandong meat-processing company, one of a group of companies that process 
chickens for Kentucky Fried Chicken, Wendy’s, and other products under the Yum! 
brand. In addition, this company also has a duck processing plant, as well as two plants 
for processing microwavable food. Established in 1988, the company now reportedly 
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directly employs more than 8,000 people and has revenue in excess of RMB 800 mil-
lion (approximately US$117 million). The company estimates that about 40 percent of 
its production comes from bases established through a series of contracts signed 
directly with approximately 10,000 households in the surrounding areas.50 It provides 
the baby chickens and ducklings, two to three days from hatching, to the participating 
farmers, as well as feed, medicine, technology, and management advice. The company 
guarantees a minimum or “protective” price, pays the farmers immediately upon 
delivery, and has generally established a solid relationship with the farmers over the 
course of time.51
Farmers who produce under contract with this firm confirm much of the company’s 
point of view. For instance, Mr. Zhao’s farmland contains three duck coops and more 
than 8,600 ducks, which he husbands, selling the full-grown ducks (after forty-six 
days) back to the company. Through his association with the company, Mr. Zhao 
reported that he can earn RMB 1,500 each month, or about RMB 18,000 (approxi-
mately US$2,600) annually. However, he argues that the company, because of its size 
and market position, holds the preponderance of power, which it uses to hold down the 
purchasing price to RMB 1 for each grown duck. Located in an urbanizing area, 
Zhao’s family land has shrunk from 1.7 mu per capita to about 0.3 mu, due to land 
expropriation by the state. Now, instead of growing grain for subsistence as they had 
previously, Mr. Zhao and his family dedicate most of their land to raising ducklings, 
retaining a small plot for growing fruits and vegetables for self-consumption. In fact, 
given their limited land, animal husbandry through contract farming may be one of a 
few viable options in the agriculture sector remaining for the Zhao family, as their reduced 
land size has partially proletarianized them.
Contract farmers bear resemblance to the commercial farmers: households remain 
the unit of production. They still control the collective land allocated to them, use fam-
ily labor, grow economic crops for nonlocal markets, transact with outside actors, and 
depend on markets for their reproduction. In this sense, they can still be considered 
simple commodity producers. The two differ, however, in two respects. First, house-
holds of contract farmers are subsumed under a bigger unit of production—the 
company—which organizes numerous households into coordinated production and 
controls the production process, at least indirectly. The contract farmer household is no 
longer an independent enterprise like a commercial farmer household but becomes a 
subunit of another enterprise. Second, due to their lack of access to capital, markets, or 
skill, contract farmers subject themselves to surplus extraction by a more socially pow-
erful economic actor. By providing farmers with the needed capital, inputs, skill, and 
market access, the corporate actor is able to gain control over the production process 
and labor products and reduce contract farmers’ negotiating power and profit margin. 
Contract farmers, on the other hand, only contribute labor and land to the production 
and are legally bound by contracts to sell his product solely to the company.
Because contract farmers like Mr. Zhao no longer have enough means of produc-
tion to produce independently, this greater degree of proletarianization weakens their 
social power vis-à-vis other actors. In comparison, for commercial farmers like the 
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coffee grower Mr. Chen in Pu’er, their control over means of production affords them 
the independence and the ability to choose among multiple purchasers of their har-
vests, enjoy a market-set price for their products, and sell to the highest bidder.52 
Contract farmers, on the other hand, have to accept a price dictated by the contracting 
company.53 Although contract farmers like Mr. Zhao are typically better off economi-
cally than they were under subsistence farming,54 they appear to be not as well off as 
independent commercial or entrepreneurial farmers.
Form 4: Semiproletarian Farm Worker with Chinese Characteristics
Partly in response to their unfavorable position vis-à-vis the companies, contract farm-
ers have often disregarded contracts and sold their harvest to other purchasers who, 
without bearing production costs the contracting company incurred, offered higher 
prices. This has created a prevalent predicament known as the “middleman problem” 
(also called “side selling”), referring to itinerant middlemen who secretly purchase 
products from companies’ production bases. In other cases, according to one report, 
contract farmers tried to deflate costs by cutting corners in the production process, 
resulting in product defects.55
From a contracting company’s perspective, one long-term solution to this middle-
man problem may come from gaining greater control over the growing and harvesting 
process and changing farmers’ incentive structure. Or, companies may find directly 
organizing agricultural production more profitable than contracting out. For either 
purpose, agribusiness firms can establish production bases by renting land from the 
legal owners of the land, the village. Under this arrangement, some rural households 
still work on the piece of household land originally allocated to them by the collective, 
although now rented to the company base, growing whatever the company assigns 
them to grow. In other cases, land is consolidated and household boundaries erased; 
farmers simply work for the company on company land. Even when farmers continue 
to work on the allocated household land, a profound change has occurred: they are 
now only providing labor in the production process, while the company controls land-
use rights and the right to dispose of harvest from the land. Through this process, they 
become semiproletarian farm workers with Chinese characteristics.
We add the appendage “with Chinese characteristics” because without China’s 
unique institution of collective land ownership and individualized land-use rights, this 
form might not have emerged. The companies that form the base typically establish 
the contractual relationship with the village collective authorities, not with the indi-
vidual farmer, as is the case with the contract farmers, because negotiating individu-
ally with farmers incurs a high transaction cost and does not guarantee contiguity in 
rented land. Because the collective land ownership restricts village authorities from 
disenfranchising rural residents from their land, it also restricts companies from 
denying rural residents jobs on company production bases. Without such a restric-
tion, an enclosure movement led by these companies could easily have forced many 
off their land and into the army of proletarianized labor. In this way, farmers become 
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semiproletarian, in that they still have an entitlement to collective land (and in fact 
often receive rent from the company). Yet they simultaneously must sell their labor to 
the company for wages. In a sense, these farmers trade their entitlement to land-use 
rights for entitlement to company jobs. They “own” (or have a right to) their jobs in a 
way unlike proletarianized workers.
Shandong’s Yuhua Date Company, which started as a TVE, was subsequently sold 
to a private company. In 1987, the enterprise began growing dates in bulk, exporting 
them to outside markets. About one-third of their production takes the form discussed 
above: the company leases farmers’ land for thirty years from the village collective 
and hires village residents to grow, manage, and harvest date trees. Farm workers are 
paid individual wages, based on the acreage of trees they tend. Yuhua does not pay 
farm workers for the dates they harvest, arguing that the company owns the harvest, 
while workers’ labor has already been compensated in wages. Through a team of fore-
men and managers in a hierarchical organizational structure, Yuhua controls and man-
ages the land it rents and closely supervises the farm workers it hires. As a result, it 
reportedly has little problem with farmers selling their produce to middlemen, which 
is deemed to be theft of company assets.
In this and other examples, we observed that rural households do benefit economi-
cally from this type of arrangement. But the social power of the farmer is among the 
lowest compared to the previous forms.56 Compared to contract farmers, these semip-
roletarian farm workers relinquish control over all means of production (although they 
often receive rent for their allocated land rights), enter into labor-selling employment 
relationships with the company, and are subjected to direct company control in the 
production process. As a result of their semiproletarianization, they lose any claim 
over the harvest and only receive wages for their labor time. The contract farmers, in 
comparison, at least retain autonomy during the production process.
When rural residents lack capital and know-how, they will often benefit financially 
by making these sorts of arrangements. In the case of the company, this form allows 
access to more farmland, enhances their control over the production process, and helps 
to overcome the middleman problem.57 However, in this form, due to the entitlement 
farm workers enjoy and companies’ incomplete control over means of production, 
companies are restricted in their ability to discipline labor, suppress wages, and extract 
surplus. Furthermore, because companies enter transactions with entire villages, the 
village authorities, acting as the collective owners of land, can engage in collective 
bargaining with companies and obtain higher rents or wages. To address these limita-
tions, companies have found other ways to obtain even greater control over their employ-
ees, the production process, and the harvest.
Form 5: Semiproletarian Farm Worker
Under this form, the company owns or otherwise controls the land of its production bases 
and hires rural workers. The farm workers, who migrate to the company’s production 
base, still possess use rights over their own land, granted by China’s dual-track land 
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system, but their land is elsewhere; it could be farmed by family members for subsis-
tence or rented out to relatives, neighbors, or entrepreneurs. Hence, the laborers are 
classified as semiproletarian farm workers: they sell labor for wages yet still retain 
access to some means of production, although not directly used.
The Dahongpo Coffee Plantation in western Yunnan Province controls a base 
of some 7,000  mu, of which 4,500 are currently cultivated with coffee plants. For 
its base, the company leases land that was previously classified as undeveloped 
land, mostly on mountain slopes, with long-term leases that expire in 2030. The 
company received capital support from the Bank of Agriculture and an earmarked 
World Bank loan to invest in infrastructure. The local government was also 
involved in the early years in attracting poor peasants to migrate to the base to 
grow coffee.
The company tightly controls the entire process of growing and harvesting. Like 
most others of its kind, this company provides land, training, fertilizer, pesticides, 
seeds, and other inputs. The company has a hierarchical organizational structure in 
place to supervise farm workers. The workforce of more than 600 farm workers (in 
168 farming households) are divided into four teams, each managed by a group of 
full-time supervisors and technicians. In total, the company employs fifteen full-
time managerial staff. The company passes down orders through this hierarchy to 
farm workers on every production procedure, ranging from when to apply fertilizer 
and pesticide to when to start harvesting. Materials such as seeds, fertilizers, and 
pesticides are also distributed from the company, through the teams and down to 
each worker family.
The company establishes a production quota for each mu of land and splits with 
farm workers the within-quota harvest on a 6:4 ratio. All of the sales from above-quota 
harvest belong to the farm workers. Company representatives acknowledge that the 
harvest belongs to the company but argue that the company chooses to give workers a 
share in the harvest, in lieu of wages, to attract workers. The company’s control of land 
and its close monitoring of the entire production process reduce the flexibility of farm 
workers here in comparison to the contract farmers who work on their own land. Farm 
workers have great difficulties in “stealing” the harvest and selling it to middlemen for 
higher prices, as the company can relatively easily monitor this. Workers also face dire 
consequences, including expulsion from the farm, if caught. Furthermore, these farm 
workers enter employment with the company individually. Compared to farm workers 
in form 4, they have no organizational or material bases to engage in collective bar-
gaining with the company.
This company leaves the impression of being a benevolent employer. Not only does 
it give farm workers a generous cut in the proceeds from the harvest, but it has also 
provided land for migrant farm workers to build their own housing (this is also out of 
necessity, so that workers can live near the fields and tend the crops more closely). The 
easy availability of undeveloped land in the area and the relatively tight labor supply 
means that the company has to offer better terms to attract migrant laborers, whose 
access to entitled collective land at home may also serve to strengthen their bargaining 
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power. Many companies that operate production bases in this form are constrained in a 
similar way: the large areas of land they can gain control of are rarely prime farmland 
but reclaimed land of various sorts, located in remote areas, another legacy of China’s 
collective land system. During interviews, company representatives repeatedly stressed 
that if they had had access to better farmland not burdened with a population of entitled 
villagers, they would not have bothered with the undeveloped land they currently used. 
When facing the choice of renting collectively owned land and then hiring villagers 
versus opening up undeveloped land and hiring migrant laborers, many companies 
embraced the latter for the greater control over labor it provided them. From the farm 
workers’ point of view, however, while the company provides job opportunities that 
would not otherwise exist, their social power is quite constrained, resting in the form of 
an escape clause: the land back home that the workers retain.
Form 6: Proletarian Farm Worker
A final form emerging in China, the proletarian farm worker, is similar to the previ-
ous type, except that, being landless laborers without major viable alternative liveli-
hoods, these farm workers are even less socially powerful. Sometimes these are laborers 
whose land has been expropriated, but more typically, the hiring company compels 
the workers to abandon their land-use rights back home. For instance, the previously 
mentioned Beigui Coffee Company started off in the 1980s as a TVE in Yunnan’s 
Pu’er Municipality. It re-formed to become a shareholding company in 1998, with the 
local Supply and Sales Cooperative, a government agency, holding the majority stake 
and workers each holding shares. Of the 10,000-mu base that the company controls, 
half is rented from farmers and half was previously classified as undeveloped land that 
the company leased long-term (fifty years) from the village collective. The operation 
involves two thousand farmers, most of whom are stable farm workers who moved 
their entire families from poor areas, primarily Zhaotong Prefecture in northeastern 
Yunnan, one of China’s poorest regions.
Unlike the previous forms, the company encourages peasants to give up their land 
rights in their home villages and to obtain a local permanent-resident permit, which 
does not grant them any entitlement to collective land. In a sense, these relocated 
migrant workers become second-class citizens in their adopted villages. They are 
members of the villages, their children can go to local schools, and they have the same 
formal political rights as locals, but they do not have access to collectively owned 
land. This arrangement completes the proletarianization of the farm workers, render-
ing them closely dependent on the company. Workers can earn income from three 
sources: First, for each mu of coffee shrubs under their cultivation, they earn a labor 
wage of RMB 15; second, as a bonus to give workers more incentive, the company 
pays a weight-based purchasing fee for the coffee beans workers yield; and third, 
workers can earn a picking fee during peak harvesting season if the company has need. 
Like Dahongpo, at Beigui, the company also takes total control over the production 
process. Given the larger size of Beigui (2,000 workers in 600 households, compared 
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to 600 workers in 168 households at Dahongpo), the company organizes production in 
a three-tiered hierarchy: company–farms–teams. While team leaders are selected from 
farm workers, the managers at the farm level are full-time emp loyees of the company. 
Overall, more than thirty salaried staff supervise the company, managing the produc-
tion process in a top-down manner.
The company argues that the farm workers are far better off than they were as a 
result. Given that these farmers had been subsistence peasants from extremely poor 
areas who migrated to Pu’er voluntarily, that is likely to be true. The company esti-
mates farm workers earn between RMB 20,000-30,000 (US$2,900-4,400) per house-
hold, which is far higher than the net rural income of any county in Zhaotong. While 
these poor farm workers likely benefit financially to some degree and even emerge 
from poverty, in terms of political and social power, they are the weakest among the 
forms we have highlighted. Land can act as a type of insurance on which poor farmers 
can often fall back as they migrate or take other risks to improve their livelihoods.58 
The fact that Beigui requires its workers to switch their household registrations, in 
effect giving up their rights to land, makes them unusually dependent on the company 
and base. The company’s need to attract workers serves as the primary barrier limiting 
the extent to which it can exploit this dependence.
In this and the two preceding forms, where agribusiness directly organizes agri-
cultural production, one sees several similarities. The rural household is dissolved as 
the unit of production, as labor is now organized on a much larger scale industrially, 
with the help of hierarchical organizations. Direct producers are all proletarianized 
to the degree that they only contribute labor to the production process. The com-
moditization of labor also replaces the patriarchal relations within families with 
exploitative relations between labor and capital. Labor-saving and productivity-
enhancing technologies are also more common in these three forms. For instance, in 
addition to advanced pesticide and seed varieties designed to increase productivity, 
large-scale irrigation systems are spread throughout these farms—an undertaking 
beyond the means of small producers in China. In other parts of the region, agribusi-
nesses have utilized biotechnologies in selecting seeds and breeding hybrids, as well 
as advanced greenhouses in cultivation. Aside from these technologies, division of 
labor and bureaucratic supervision have also been added and refined to maximize 
labor efficiency and production quality. All these measures help agribusiness to 
organize agricultural production processes that achieve productivity that is superior 
to that of small farmers, making it profitable for agribusiness to directly engage in 
agricultural production.
Conclusion
Rapid development of land, labor, and capital markets in rural China has triggered 
fundamental changes in how these factors of production are controlled and used and 
how agricultural production is organized. Well-developed markets for agricultural 
products allow some rural households to shift from producing subsistence staples to 
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economic crops, base their livelihood entirely on commercial exchanges, and become 
commercial farmers. Labor and land markets, on the other hand, allow both entrepre-
neurial individuals and corporate actors to expand agricultural production beyond the 
traditional household-based smallholdings and enter into new employment and author-
ity relations with direct producers.59
We hypothesized that introduction of these capitalist forms and relations of produc-
tion would lead to the differentiation of the Chinese peasantry along two directions: 
maintaining the household as unit of production but commoditizing its reproduction or 
commoditizing labor and organizing labor beyond the household into production. Our 
empirical analysis shows that the hypothesized peasant differentiation is indeed well 
underway in rural China. Through entering six different forms of nonpeasant produc-
tion, former peasants are differentiating into a variety of new class positions. While 
national data are not yet available on how widespread these forms are, our observa-
tions from two geographically and economically contrasting provinces and numerous 
reports in Chinese media and research publications suggest that these processes of 
agrarian transition and peasant differentiation are progressing nationwide.60 The cen-
tral government’s announcement in 2008 that it would further spur the development of 
rural land markets and scaled-up agriculture will add more fuel to this fire.
The differentiation of Chinese peasants raises another question: for agricultural 
producers now working in capitalist agriculture, how do their socioeconomic statuses 
vary? While quantitative confirmation awaits more comprehensive data, our findings 
point to a general pattern: the rise of market situations in determining socioeconomic 
status in China’s rural stratification structure. All producers in the nonpeasant forms 
of production differ from peasants in one aspect: their reproduction is fully integrated 
into markets and based on commodity relations. As such, their socioeconomic statuses 
are determined by their positions in markets, especially in land and labor markets. 
More specifically, varying degrees of proletarianization of direct producers are associ-
ated with their diverging socioeconomic situations and their social power vis-à-vis 
other economic actors.
The labor-hiring and land-renting entrepreneurial farmers are clearly the best off. 
Not only have they expanded the scale of production, but more importantly, they occupy 
superior positions in authority relations, have greater social power, and can appropri-
ate the labor surplus of the workers they hire. Commercial farmers’ control over means 
of production allows them to produce independently and enjoy the full benefits of 
commercialized production. Contract farmers, in comparison, are partially proletari-
anized and have to rely on inputs from capital owners to engage in commercial pro-
duction. Even the autonomy they seem to enjoy in the production process is more 
apparent than real, as households become subunits organized by companies and pro-
duction processes are dictated from without. Many producers are proletarianized to 
even greater degrees, due to a variety of reasons, ranging from total loss of land to 
unproductive or insufficient land. With relatively little social power, these producers 
enter into much more precarious positions in capitalist agriculture. They are domi-
nated in authority relations, have little autonomy in the production process, and only 
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receive wages for their labor. Among these farm workers, we still find nuanced differ-
ences in their degree of proletarianization. The semiproletarian farm workers in form 4, 
thanks to the land rights they rented to the companies, enjoy an entitlement to their 
jobs; the proletarian farm workers in form 6, on the other hand, are totally dependent 
on their employers, not only for their jobs but also for residential statuses. In sum, we 
propose that under the scope conditions of participation in nonpeasant forms of agri-
culture, the stratification of agricultural producers in rural China is primarily deter-
mined by their market positions (and less by demographic patterns or political power). 
More specifically, we suggest that the increasing proletarianization of direct producers 
tends to weaken their social power and economic benefits.
Our findings also highlight the importance of specific local social institutions in 
mediating the confrontation between capitalism and agriculture in rural China. As land 
is the most important means of production in agriculture, the institution that deter-
mines the distribution of land rights—in rural China’s case, collective ownership and 
individualized use rights—constrains the form and extent of capitalism’s penetration 
into agriculture, as well as the proletarianization of direct producers.
Through the discussion above, we can see that differences across labor regimes in 
the six forms can largely be attributed to the way in which rural producers maintain their 
access to collective land and bring that into the production process. The entitlement-
based land rights, on one hand, allow subsistence peasants to reject commoditization 
and resist capitalism; on the other hand, these rights also provide a base for commercial 
farmers—and contract farmers to a much less degree—to continue independent house-
hold production. Even when land rights are controlled by agribusiness, as in forms 4 
and 5, laborers’ entitlement still provides them some leverage and protection.
In sum, rural China’s land system constrains capital’s tendency to proletarianize 
direct producers and acts as a unique social condition that shapes the spread of capitalism 
in Chinese agriculture. On the basis of these observations, we venture to argue that by 
offering varying degrees of protection to producers against the domination, exploitation, 
and dispossession by capital, rural China’s entitlement-based land system augments the 
social power of direct producers, weakens the disruptive effects of capitalism, and, thus, 
reduces direct producers’ resistance to capitalism. However, from many agribusinesses’ 
perspective, this institution is an obstacle to growth. Nearly all of the companies we 
interviewed expressed a desire to expand their production bases but found the primary 
barrier to be want of land—or, put in another way, the difficulty in wresting control over 
collective land from rural households. In fact, many companies and entrepreneurs that 
established bases have been compelled to do so often on previously unproductive land 
that they themselves develop as farmland. Instead of using land that is currently being 
farmed by peasants and farmers, some companies in Yunnan have even chosen to ven-
ture into Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar to acquire land and expand production.
Discussion
In this study, we have focused on analyzing how the introduction of capitalist forms 
and relations of production into Chinese agriculture transforms rural social structure. 
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It is important to note, however, that we agree with critics of the Marxist tradition of 
agrarian studies that capitalist relations of production are not the only forces shaping 
rural social structure. The industrialization of the natural process of agriculture, for 
example, can also change social structure61—and has been carried out under social-
ism. We also acknowledge that agriculture poses special obstacles to the penetration 
of capitalism and reject the teleological assumption in some Marxist—especially 
Leninist—agrarian studies that sees growth of capitalism in agriculture as a natural 
tendency and the resulting differentiation and eventual dissolution of the peasantry as 
a predetermined outcome. In fact, we stress how rural China’s land-rights institutions 
act as a unique constraint on the penetration of capitalism. We do, however, argue that 
capitalism nevertheless remains a powerful force in shaping rural social structures and 
will transform many agricultural producers from peasants to new class positions as 
shaped by capitalist labor relations.
We documented various nonpeasant forms of production that have emerged in 
China’s agrarian transition. To some extent, the emergence of these forms is sparked 
through the experimentation of various actors. For instance, agribusiness firms have 
attempted various arrangements in a bid to find one that better fits their interests. To a 
more limited extent, direct producers, through trial and error as opportunities emerge, 
enter and exit different forms, seeking to enhance their incomes. Similarly, local govern-
ments, sometimes acting as facilitators but other times acting more directly as entre-
preneurs, have encouraged the development of capitalist production. This study, however, 
does not engage in a systematic investigation on what factors determine the emergence 
and dominance of one form in an area as opposed to other possible alternatives, although 
we suggested some tentative hypotheses. This question awaits future research.
This study also has implications for the debate on land privatization in China. Our 
findings suggest that the collective land ownership in rural China—despite well-
publicized and very real land grabs, both legal and illegal—has allowed the rise of 
agrarian capitalism in China to proceed without the mass displacement of peasants that 
has occurred in some other countries. Under private land ownership, however, compa-
nies (or individual entrepreneurs) can acquire land without having to absorb labor 
previously attached to it. Companies can then replace labor either through mechaniza-
tion where possible or, in the case of labor-intensive crops, by hiring landless laborers. 
Either way, labor wage will be further suppressed and surplus extraction will intensify. 
Against the social power of more organized and resourceful forces with designs on 
scarce land and cheap labor, disorganized and poor peasants have few weapons with 
which to resist. The collective ownership of land, however, gives producers an imper-
fect, yet significant, modicum of power over a scarce resource—land—with which to 
bargain with these more powerful forces, much to the benefit of China. At the same 
time, endowing the farmers with these rights has not prevented the scaling up of pro-
duction that is the goal of China’s government.62 In fact, the scales of production in 
these newly emerged capitalist forms are generally larger than those under both the 
land-reform period and the HRS. In each of the forms 3 to 6, for example, production 
has exceeded the household scale, with some plantations we visited reaching 10,000 
mu. In contrast, under the Land Reform and HRS, production was carried out on the 
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household scale, which translated to less than one single mu in densely populated parts 
of China.
Our study, however, also shows that increasing the scale of production and subor-
dinating direct producers to agribusinesses does not need to be the only way to mod-
ernize China’s agriculture and improve rural lives. On this point, this study reinforces 
Philip Huang’s recent argument about the viability of household-based, smallholding 
agriculture in China, at least for the foreseeable future.63 Huang derives his argument 
from macro-level trends in the changing rural demography and national dietary pat-
terns. He argues that the declining agricultural labor force—thanks to rural-to-urban 
migration and declining birth rates—and the increasing dietary demand for animal-
based foods, fruits, and vegetables will reverse the long-existing trend of agricultural 
involution among China’s smallholding agriculturalists. This will allow them to 
employ more fully their family labor and produce higher-value cash crops, resulting in 
rising per capita productivity and income. Our findings in this study contribute by sup-
plying the micro-level mechanisms through which small household producers make 
the transition from involutionary subsistence farming to developmental commercial 
farming. Expansion of capitalism into China’s agriculture not only has failed to end 
smallholding household production, it in fact has offered opportunities for commer-
cialized small family farms to remain viable and benefit from market growth.
After millennia of organized agricultural production, more than half a century after 
the Communist Revolution in China, and decades after the establishment of the HRS, 
the phenomenon described here, we believe, represents the start of a new phase of 
social change in rural China—the transition to agrarian capitalism—which also ushers 
in the differentiation of the Chinese peasantry. This change will have profound impact 
on rural Chinese society and needs to be considered in future studies of rural China.
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Professor Cheng Housi of Yunnan University of Nationalities for his valuable 
assistance during our fieldwork and the Politics & Society editorial board for their useful 
comments.
Declaration of Conflicting Interest
The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication 
of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or author-
ship of this article: Singapore Management University’s Office of Research provided funds for 
this research.
Notes
1. Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 
1350-1988 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
484  Politics & Society 38(4)
 2. One mu is approximately one-sixth of an acre (0.1667 acres).
 3. Henry Bernstein and Terence J. Byres, “From Peasant Studies to Agrarian Change,” Jour-
nal of Agrarian Change 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–56. At times scholars’ objections to the term 
“peasant” appear to be no more than either knee-jerk reaction, as when authors use the 
term interchangeably with “farmers” without defining and differentiating between the two 
concepts—Robert F. Ash, “The Peasant and the State,” China Quarterly 127 (1991): 493–
526—or eschew the use of the term because of its derogatory connotations, without con-
sidering the analytical purchase it provides—Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed 
China: Power of the People (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996). Despite this, many more 
considered objections to the term are not easily dismissed.
 4. Henry Bernstein, “Concepts for the Analysis of Contemporary Peasantries,” Journal of 
Peasant Studies 6 (1979): 421–44.
 5. Harriet Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National Economy: Concepts for the 
Analysis of Agrarian Formations,” Journal of Peasant Studies 7 (1980): 160.
 6. Ibid., 163.
 7. Teodor Shanin, “Peasantry: A Delineation of Concept and a Field of Study,” European 
Journal of Sociology 12 (1971): 289–300.
 8. We are aware that Friedmann also advocates for the replacement of the term “peasant” 
with new concepts that are based on specified forms of production. However, what she 
considers the weakness of the term “peasant”—being negatively defined as resisting com-
moditization and rejecting market integration—precisely identifies the point of departure 
for the transition that this study focuses on. On the other hand, to parse out different forms 
of production that exist among peasants and then formulate new concepts to replace “peas-
ant” is not the goal of this study.
 9. Without detouring into the details, we note that Friedmann’s definition and use of the term 
“simple commodity production” (Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National 
Economy”) differs from that of other authors—Judith Ennew, Paul Hirst, and Keith Tribe, 
“‘Peasantry’ as an Economic Category,” Journal of Peasant Studies 4 (1977): 295–322; 
and Bernstein, “Concepts for the Analysis of Contemporary Peasantries”—who equate 
peasants with simple commodity producers and argue for the replacement of term “peas-
ants” with the concept “simple commodity producers.”
10. Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National Economy.” There is a third direction 
of transformation, albeit not into a capitalist but a socialist form of production: households 
dissolve as units of production, yet the noncommoditized reproduction remains. This hap-
pened in China under socialist collectivized agriculture, as will be discussed shortly.
11. Henry Bernstein, “Agrarian Questions Then and Now,” Journal of Peasant Studies 24 
(1996): 22–59.
12. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development. Naturally, in rural China, just like 
in other rural societies, a diversity of forms of production and classes of producers existed 
historically. In the late Imperial and Republican periods in particular, commoditization in 
agriculture progressed to a relatively high degree in some pockets of the country. However, 
it suffices to say that the household-based, noncommoditized peasant production remained 
the most prevalent form, and peasantry remained the dominant class among agricultural 
Zhang and Donaldson 485
producers. Furthermore, precedents of de-peasantization were both geographically isolated 
and historically truncated.
13. Chris Bramall and Marion E. Jones, “The Fate of the Chinese Peasantry since 1978,” in 
Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America, ed. D. Bry-
ceson, C. Kay, and J. Mooji (London, UK: Intermediate Technologies Publications, 2000).
14. Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development toward 
Socialism, 1949-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
15. The smallholding peasant economy, after all, was considered by Lenin as “engender(ing) 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass 
scale.” Daniel Kelliher, “Chinese Communist Political Theory and the Rediscovery of the 
Peasantry,” Modern China 20, no. 4 (1994): 387–415. The distrust of peasants’ political 
“dual nature” ran through generations of Communist thinkers and leaders.
16. Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National Economy,” 163.
17. Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).
18. Bramall and Jones, “Fate of the Chinese Peasantry since 1978.”
19. Shanin, “Peasantry,” 3.
20. Bramall and Jones, “Fate of the Chinese Peasantry since 1978.”
21. Scott Waldron, Colin Brown, and John Longworth, “State Sector Reform and Agriculture 
in China,” China Quarterly 186 (2006): 277–94.
22. See, for instance, William H. Hinton, The Privatization of China: The Great Reversal 
(London, UK: Earthscan, 1991); Xiaoyuan Dong, “Two-Tier Land Tenure System and 
Sustained Economic Growth in Post-1978 Rural China,” World Development 24, no. 5 
(1996): 915–28; Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li, and Scott Rozelle, “Land Rights 
in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues,” China Journal 47 (2002): 67–97; and Chris 
Bramall, “Chinese Land Reform in Long-Run Perspective and in the Wider East Asian 
Context,” Journal of Agrarian Change 4 (2004): 107–41.
23. Bramall, “Chinese Land Reform.” However, whether land consolidation leads to produc-
tivity gains is debated. If farm size increases, but not to the extent of allowing mechaniza-
tion and is not associated with increased labor input, land productivity may decline due to 
reduced per unit labor input and a lower intensity of land use. Land consolidation has to be 
carried out in certain ways, such as moving land to more efficient users, to increase pro-
ductivity. Forrest Q. Zhang, “Retreat from Equality or Advance toward Efficiency? Land 
Markets and Inequality in Rural Zhejiang,” China Quarterly 195 (2008): 535–57.
24. Waldron, Brown, and Longworth, “State Sector Reform and Agriculture in China.”
25. Alan De Brauw, Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle, Linxiu Zhang, and Yigang Zhang, “The Evo-
lution of China’s Rural Labor Markets During the Reforms,” Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics 30, no. 2 (2002): 329–53.
26. Bryan Lohmar, Scott Rozelle, and Changbao Zhao, “The Rise of Rural-to-Rural Labor 
Markets in China,” Asian Geographer 20, no. 1–2 (2001): 101-23.
27. Ling Zhu, Zhongyi Jiang, and Joachim von Braun, Credit System for the Rural Poor 
in China (New York, NY: Nova Science, 1997); and Linxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang, and 
Scott Rozelle, “China’s War on Poverty: Assessing Targeting and the Growth Impacts of 
486  Politics & Society 38(4)
Poverty Programs,” Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies 1, no. 3 (2003): 
301–17.
28. Kellee S. Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002).
29. Brandt et al., “Land Rights in Rural China.”
30. We hasten to add that expropriation of farmland by state agencies is possible and has hap-
pened so frequently that it has become a major source of contention in rural China. Xiaolin 
Guo, “Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China,” China Quarterly 166 (2001): 
422–39. This kind of land grab, however, can only happen with the use of the state’s coer-
cive power and mostly for nonagricultural uses of the land. Private actors, no matter how 
economically powerful, cannot deprive agricultural producers of their land and then use 
that land for agriculture.
31. Q. Forrest Zhang, Qingguo Ma, and Xu Xu, “Development of Land Rental Markets in 
Rural Zhejiang: Growth of Off-Farm Jobs and Institution Building,” China Quarterly 
180 (2004): 1040–62; James K. S. Kung, “Off-Farm Labor Markets and the Emergence 
of Land Rental Markets in Rural China,” Journal of Comparative Economics 30, no. 2 
(2002): 395–414; Brandt et al., “Land Rights in Rural China”; and Scott Rozelle, Jikun 
Huang, and Keijiro Otsuka, “The Engines of a Viable Agriculture: Advances in Bio-
technology, Market Accessibility and Land Rentals in Rural China,” China Journal 53 
(2005): 82–111.
32. Jonathan Unger, “The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside: A Survey of 
Twenty-Eight Villages,” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 4 (1985–1986): 585–606; Fengqin 
Liu, “Buwanquan Heyue Yu Luyue Zhang’ai: Yi Dingdan Nongye Weili” [Incom-
plete Contracts and Obstacles to Contract Enforcement: The Example of Contract 
Farming], Jingji Yanjiu [Economic Research] 4 (2003): 1–22; and Hongdong Guo, 
Robert W. Jolly, and Jianhua Zhu, “Contract Farming in China: Perspectives of Farm 
Households and Agribusiness Firms,” Comparative Economic Studies 49 (2007): 
285–312.
33. This is likely because these researchers’ instruments do not detect the increasing num-
bers of commercial and entrepreneurial farmers in China. Honglin Wang, Xiaoxia Dong, 
Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang, and Thomas Reardon, “Producing and Procuring Horticultural 
Crops with Chinese Characteristics: The Case of Northern China,” World Development 37, 
no. 11 (2009): 1791–801.
34. Alain De Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1981).
35. Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National Economy,” 166.
36. Ibid., 163.
37. Some households may choose to specialize in producing staple grains for nonlocal mar-
kets. But to do that, they must produce in large enough quantities to be worthwhile, which, 
in China’s context, would require them to expand with more land and labor beyond the 
household endowments and through market transactions.
38. Max Weber, “Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany,” in From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth 
and C. W. Mills (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1958), 363.
Zhang and Donaldson 487
39. Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966); Teodor Shanin, “The 
Nature and Logic of the Peasant Economy, II,” Journal of Peasant Studies 1 (1974): 186–206; 
and Bernstein, “Concepts for the Analysis of Contemporary Peasantries.”
40. Friedmann, “Household Productions and the National Economy,” 176.
41. Ibid., 163.
42. Other factors such as population growth have also created insufficiency of land for subsis-
tence in some parts of China. As a result, some members of rural households become pro-
letarianized and have to sell their labor for wage employment—sometimes in agriculture, 
thus becoming other forms of producers.
43. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South-
east Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).
44. In the remainder of the article, we use “commercial farming” and “simple commodity 
production” interchangeably.
45. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development; and William L. Parish, Chinese 
Rural Development: The Great Transformation (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985).
46. The purchased coffee beans are processed in Nestlé’s factory in Dongguan Municipality 
in Guangdong Province, where instant coffee is produced for China’s swelling legion of 
coffee drinkers.
47. Hong’s family income is many times larger than the average annual net per capita rural 
income in 2007 for Yunnan (RMB 2,250) and China (RMB 3,587). The exchange rate is 
based on US$1 = RMB 6.837, the prevailing rate in June 2009.
48. Karl Kautsky, The Agrarian Question (Winchester, MA: Zwan, 1899/1988); Susan A. 
Mann and James M. Dickinson, “Obstacles to the Development of Capitalist Agriculture,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 5 (1978): 466–81; Harriet Friedmann, “World Markets, State 
and Family Farm: Social Bases of Household Production in the Era of Wage Labor,” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978): 545–86; and David Goodman, Bernardo 
Sorj, and John Wilkinson, From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial 
Development (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
49. See, for example, Liu, “Buwanquan Heyue”; Kaiwen Feng, “Cunmin Zizhi, Hezuoshe He 
Nongye Chanyehua Jingying Zhidu De Xietiao Yanjing: Laizi Shangdong Yantai De Dia-
ocha Baogao” [Co-evolution of Rural Self-Governance, Cooperatives and the Institution of 
Industrialized Agricultural Production: A Survey Report from Yantai, Shandong], Chinese 
Rural Economy 2 (2003): 45–50; Dinghuan Hu, Thomas Reardon, Scott Rozelle, Peter 
Timmer, and Honglin Wang, “The Emergence of Supermarkets with Chinese Characteristics: 
Challenges and Opportunities for China’s Agricultural Development,” Development Policy 
Review 22, no. 2 (2004): 557–86; and Guo, Jolly, and Zhu, “Contract Farming in China.”
50. A further 40 to 50 percent of their production comes from a more formal contract with vil-
lage governments, form 4 in our typology. Thus, this case, as with many others, produces 
through multiple forms.
51. A majority of contract farmers surveyed cited the guaranteed price as the main reason why 
they entered such agreements, according to a recent survey. Sachiko Miyata, Nicholas 
Minot, and Dinghuan Hu, “Impact of Contract Farming on Income: Linking Small Farm-
ers, Packers, and Supermarkets in China,” World Development 37, no. 11 (2009): 1781–90.
488  Politics & Society 38(4)
52. This is consistent with recent research that concludes that small farmers generally can ben-
efit from participation in modern agriculture, but mainly when they dominate the produc-
tion mix and participate as producers. See Thomas Reardon, Christopher B. Barrett, Julio 
A. Berdegue, and Johan F. M. Swinnen, “Agrifood Industry Transformation and Small 
Farmers in Developing Countries,” World Development 37, no. 11 (2009): 1717–26.
53. Theoretically, contract farmers can enjoy one advantage: they can shield themselves from 
market risks by obtaining from the company a protecting, floor price for their products. 
In our fieldwork, we routinely found that farmers, sometimes even the local governments, 
try to secure protection prices from the contracting company, often to no avail. Even when 
a protecting price is put in contract, it often does not materialize into real protection. Mr. 
Zhao told us, for example, that when market price dropped below the protecting price on 
contract, the company would simply raise prices of inputs sold to farmers to offset the 
difference.
54. Miyata, Minot, and Hu, “Impact of Contract Farming on Income.”
55. Ibid.; and Hongbin Li, “Zai Nongye Chanyehua Fazhan Zhong Peiyu He Tigao Nongmin 
Zuzhihua Chengdu Yanjiu” [A Study on Nurturing and Strengthening the Organization 
of Farmers through Developing Agricultural Vertical Integration], Nongye Jingji Wenti 
[Issues in Agricultural Economy] 1 (2008): 99–102.
56. Similarly, one recent study also concludes that farmers’ bargaining power tends to be 
considerably lower, in part because of the detailed contracts that constrain the scope for 
bargaining and the village collectives’ role as brokers. Randy Stringer, Naiquan San, and 
Andre Croppenstedt, “Producers, Processors, and Procurement Decisions: The Case of 
Vegetable Supply Chains in China,” World Development 37, no. 11 (2009): 1773–80.
57. For instance, one study of vegetable production in China finds that companies prefer to this 
form for the “most pesticide sensitive, high value vegetables.” Ibid.
58. Dong, “Two-Tier Land Tenure System.”
59. Another type of actor often found active in China’s agricultural modernization is the agri-
cultural cooperative, organized mainly on a voluntary basis by groups of farmers or one 
or more village collectives. These cooperatives, which reemerged in the late 1980s and 
increased steadily to more than 150,000 nationwide by the middle of the current decade, 
can be structured in different forms. Yamei Hu, Zuhui Huang, George Hendrikse, and 
Xuchu Xu, “Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China” 
(Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Erasmus Research Institute of Management, 2005); and 
Feifei Zhang, Guoxia Wang, and Jianming Cai, “Different Types of Agricultural Coopera-
tives with Periurban Farmers in China: Two Cases,” UA-Magazine 17 (2007): 35–37. The 
great variety among cooperatives precludes attempts to categorize them into their own 
type. Many cooperatives appear to be no more than variations of other forms described in 
this article. For example, when a group of households form a cooperative in a bottom-up 
manner and pool their resources to expand production through renting more land and hir-
ing labor, these producers are essentially entrepreneurial farmers. On the other hand, the 
top-down cooperatives in which residents within the cooperative hold land-usage rights, 
but the land and production are managed in a hierarchical manner, can be considered as a 
variant of form 4, the semiproletarian farm workers with Chinese characteristics.
Zhang and Donaldson 489
60. An exception to this can be found in Wang et al., “Producing and Procuring Horticul-
tural Crops with Chinese Characteristics.” These authors’ survey of Beijing and Shandong 
surprisingly finds no incidence of contract farming. However, their measures apparently 
do not allow them to detect commercial or entrepreneurial farmers, which our fieldwork 
revealed were common forms among the vegetable farmers we interviewed in Shandong. 
If they had, the study would likely have revealed that the changes in the retail system had 
indeed sparked important changes affecting the relative power of the producers they sur-
veyed vis-à-vis agribusiness and other actors.
61. Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson, From Farming to Biotechnology.
62. Recent studies have also cited poor farmers’ access to land under current institutional 
arrangements as one reason why poorer, smaller farmers have gained from changes in 
food retailing. Wang et al., “Producing and Procuring Horticultural Crops with Chinese 
Characteristics.” Less than formal property rights have also benefited small producers in 
other contexts. In Romania, for example, small-scale farmers fought against the privatiza-
tion of “communal property,” in this case a granary that had previously been part of the 
village’s collective farm under the previous communist regime. Katherine Verdery, “Fuzzy 
Property: Rights, Power, and Identity in Transylvania’s Decollectivization,” in Uncertain 
Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World, ed. Michael Burawoy and 
Katherine Verdery (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
63. Philip C. C. Huang, “Zhongguo nongye mianling de lishixing qiji” [China’s Agricul-
ture Faces a Historical Opportunity], Dushu [Readings] 10 (2006): 118–29; and Philip 
C. C. Huang and Peng Yusheng, “Sanda lishixing bianqian de jiaohui yu zhongguo 
xiaoguimo nongye de qianjing” [The Convergence of Three Historical Changes and 
the Prospects for China’s Small-Scale Agriculture], Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Chinese 
Social Sciences] 4 (2007): 74–88.
Bios
Q. Forrest Zhang (forrestzhang@smu.edu.sg) received his PhD in sociology from Yale in 
2004. He started investigating China’s agrarian transition in a study, published in 2004 in the 
China Quarterly, on the growth of land markets in rural China. This current article is the fourth 
in this series and will be followed by studies on reforms in China’s state farms and on contract 
farming.
John A. Donaldson (jdonaldson@smu.edu.sg) graduated in 2005 from George Washington 
University with a PhD in political science. In addition to his research on the transformation of 
China’s agrarian system, he also studies local rural poverty reduction policies in China and 
central-local relations. Outside the Chinese context, he has also published on the political 
dimension of the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. His research 
has been published in such journals as World Development, International Studies Quarterly, 
China Journal, and China Quarterly.
